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0. Introduction
This paper looks at two theories of negative polarity licensing that utilize the 
notion of strength or strengthening to explain NPI distribution. I consider Kadmon 
and Landman (1993) and Israel (1996, 2001, 2005), both of whom define strength 
in terms of downward inferencing relations.  
 I claim that various compromising adverbs such as pretty much, virtually, 
practically, etc., disrupt this pragmatic inferencing and so raise problems for 
theories depending on this type of motion. Taking pretty much as a test case, I 
suggest that the compromising data can be accounted for by the semantic notion 
of (non)veridicality, as demonstrated in Giannakidou (1998, 1999, 2002, etc.). In 
the rest of the paper then, I will illustrate the problems the compromisers raise 
first for Kadmon and Landman (K&L) and then Israel. The last section shows 
how the (non)veridicality theory of Giannakidou successfully manages the data. 
 First, however, it is necessary to make some general remarks in regard to the 
meaning and use of pretty much. As a compromiser or otherwise, pretty much has 
rarely been mentioned in linguistic literature. However, the approximator almost, 
which has a similar (though not identical) semantics and distribution has received 
much attention over the years (Sadock 1981, Rapp and von Stechow 1999, Horn 
2002, Morzycki 2002, etc.). In the next section, I will provide a brief introduction 
to the semantics and syntax of pretty much as they compare with almost.  
1. Meaning and Use of Pretty Much
There are at least two uses of pretty much, which might not be totally distinct 
from one another. Use 1 is a speaker-oriented hedge, which normally requires a 
parenthetical pause to set it apart from the sentence it modifies. As with most 
hedges this use can occur before or after almost any constituent, and it makes a 
comment on the speaker’s commitment to that particular element or to what is 
said generally: i.e., it can take wide or narrow scope. Importantly, this use almost 
always requires a parenthetical pause. 
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(1) USE 1: speaker-oriented hedge that does not contribute to semantic truth 
conditions. Requires parenthetical pause. 
 
The arrows in (2) indicate possible hedge sites (though the longer the parentheti-
cal pause the more versatile the hedge becomes), and the scope can often be 
predicted by its location—though again, not always. This use does not seem to 
contribute to the semantic truth conditions, and I will consider two diagnostics in 
§1.5 in support of this suggestion.  
 
(2) ^ Rikki ^ saw ^ all his friends ^ in Georgia ^ last summer ^.  (Use 1) 
 
 Use 2, however, is fully integrated into the syntactic structure: it does not 
require a parenthetical pause. I suggest Use 2 does contribute to semantic content. 
And, we see in (4) that its distribution is much more limited than the speaker 
hedge in Use 1. 
 
(3) USE 2: Compromising adverb that does contribute to truth conditions. No 
parenthetical pause is required. It is fully integrated to the syntax, as in 
(4): 
 
(4) Rikki ^ saw ^ all his friends in Georgia last summer.   (Use 2) 
 
Non-pause pretty much (Use 2) does not generally appear sentence initial, as in 
(5a-b), unless it is restricting a universal quantifier, as in (5c). Use 1 is fine 
sentence initial in (5d-e).  
 
(5) a. *Pretty much someone stole the crown jewels.  (Use 2) 
 b. *Pretty much Bret ate all the meat.    (Use 2) 
c. Pretty much everyone left the party early.   (Use 2) 
d. Pretty much, someone stole the crown jewels.  (Use 1) 
 e. Pretty much, Bret ate all the meat.    (Use 1) 
  
Use 2 does not generally occur immediately below negation as in (6a), but it is 
okay with a bit more distance (6b). Use 1 is fine immediately below negation in 
(6c) or at a distance in (6d).  
 
(6) a. *Gene didn’t pretty much see anyone.   (Use 2) 
 b. Gene didn’t see pretty much anyone.    (Use 2) 
c. Gene didn’t, pretty much, see anyone.   (Use 1) 
 d. Gene didn’t see, pretty much, anyone.   (Use 1) 
 
From here on, I will be interested only in Use 2, or the one that is fully integrated 
to the syntax and contributes semantic content.  
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1.1. What Pretty Much Modifies 
Pretty much, like almost, can function as a verbal modifier or a nominal modifier, 
as in (7a) and (7b), respectively. I will rely on both the nominal and verbal 
modifiers throughout this paper, but primarily so on the verbal modifier.  
 As a nominal modifier, almost prefers to restrict universals, as in (7b), and so 
has been used as a diagnostic for universal quantification (Carlson 1981, but see 
Horn 2005 for an alternate view). In (7b) we see pretty much prefers universals as 
well. In (7b′) the existential someone is difficult for both pretty much and almost. 
 
(7) a. Rod {pretty much/almost} won the race. 
 b. {Pretty much/almost} everyone left the party early. 
 b′. *{Pretty much/almost} someone left the party early 
 
 In (7c), in which anyone would seem to require an existential reading under 
the negation, almost appears to be unacceptable. Examples such as (7c) have a 
long history of “ungrammaticality”, dating at least to Horn (1972), Carlson 
(1981), and others over the last three decades. (But see Horn 2005 for numerous 
examples that suggest this construction is more acceptable than previously 
thought.) 
 
(7) c. (*)I didn’t talk to almost anyone. 
 c′. *I didn’t almost talk to anyone. 
 
 Pretty much in the same position appears to be less controversial. In (7d) it 
straightforwardly modifies anyone under negation. However, in (7e) it is less 
acceptable directly under negation, as is almost above in (7c′).  
 
(7) d. I didn’t talk to pretty much anyone. 
 e. *I didn’t pretty much talk to anyone. 
 
I’ll return to examples like (7d) a bit more in §2.1, as they will be useful in 
arguing against Chierchia (2004), who proposes a theory of NPI licensing based 
on an extension of K&L, but with a more rigid scope definition. 
 
1.2. Scalar Positions of Pretty Much and Almost 
Pretty much seems to occupy a point or range of points nearer the endpoint of the 
relevant scale than does almost. In (8a) almost suggests completion of Sid’s 
dissertation is close, but that it clearly has not been achieved.  
 
(8) a. Sid has almost finished his dissertation. 
 
In (8b) pretty much also suggests completion is close, but there is the further 
suggestion that ultimate completion could hinge on something other than Sid’s 
not having finished writing the dissertation.  
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(8) b. Sid has pretty much finished his dissertation. 
 
A likely explanation for this is that pretty much suggests a point nearer the scalar 
endpoint than does almost: <pretty much, almost, not quite, halfway, etc.>. So in 
an ordering of steps to ‘dissertation completion’,1 almost finished might allow one 
to still be in the writing process, while pretty much finished might extend from the 
final stages of writing to the post-writing administrative tasks of dissertation 
completion, as in (8c) where Sid has finished writing his dissertation but has yet 
to defend or file it.  
 
(8) c. Sid is pretty much finished with his dissertation, now he just has to 
defend it. 
 
In (8d) with almost, it seems odd to continue with the exception of Sid having to 
defend the dissertation. For comparison, not quite seems even worse in this 
example. 
   
(8) d. # Sid is {almost, not quite} finished with his dissertation, now he 
just has to defend it. 
 
The difference in scalar positions is supported by Horn’s (1972) diagnostic for 
quantitative scales, in which the conjunction in fact requires the second conjunct 
to make a stronger claim than the first.  
 
(9) a. Johnny almost won the race, in fact he pretty much did win it. 
 b. # Johnny pretty much won the race, in fact he almost did win it. 
  
One final example suggesting the differing scalar locations is adapted from Horn 
(2002). 
 
(9) c. Republicans would concede that Gore almost won the 2000 
election, but most would deny that he pretty much won it. 
 
1.3. Almost Counterfactuals 
Another clear contrast between pretty much and almost is that most of the almost 
examples allow a counterfactual reading in addition to approximating, while 
pretty much allows only the compromising reading. In (10) pretty much provides 
the expected weakening of the strong NPI lift a finger such that Tommy actually 
did lift a finger to help, but only a little bit.  
 
(10) Tommy {pretty much/almost} didn’t lift a finger to help. 
                                                 
1 We might envision such an ordering as something like <filing, defense, writing, outlining, etc.> 
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However, with almost, the more primary reading is a counterfactual one, where 
Tommy had planned not to help but then changed his mind. Perhaps a paraphrase 
such as Tommy wasn’t going to lift a finger to help, but then he did after all when 
he remembered the Good Samaritan parable. In this reading there need not be a 
comment on the amount of help Tommy actually gave. (Cf. Rapp and von Ste-
chow 1999 for discussion of almost counterfactuals.)  
 If we increase the strength of the NPI using a squatitive (Horn 2001, and 
unpublished work by Háj Ross and Paul Postal 1995), only the counterfactual 
reading seems to be available, as in (11), and Vince cannot be said to have 
received even a small amount of the item X in question. 
 
(11) Vince almost didn’t get squat.  
 
In (12), however, with the pretty much squatitive, Vince clearly can have received 
just a little bit of X. 
 
(12) Vince pretty much didn’t get squat. 
 
1.4. Composition of Pretty Much 
Much is an understating NPI, as in (13a).2 It makes weaker claims than stronger 
NPIs, as in (13b), and it is awkward in the non-negative environment in (13c).  
 
(13) a. Ted doesn’t read much. 
 b. Ted doesn’t read at all. 
 c. *Ted reads much. 
 
 Pretty, as intensifying adverb, prefers a positive environment, as in (14a), and 
it is less acceptable under negation in (14b).   
 
(14) a. Axl was pretty late last night. 
b. *Axl wasn’t pretty late last night. 
  
This allergy toward negation isn’t normal behavior for an intensifier, as can be 
seen in a comparison with very in (15). 
 
(15) a. Axl was very late last night. 
 b. Axl wasn’t very late last night. 
 
Compositionally, pretty much amounts to a fusion of a PPI and an NPI. For the 
most part, its distribution is similar to a PPI. It is perfectly acceptable in (16a) in a 
positive environment and less acceptable in the immediate negative environment 
                                                 
2 Cf. Israel (1996) on understating NPIs. 
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of (16b). 
 
(16) a. David Lee pretty much doesn’t want to go to school. 
b. *David Lee doesn’t pretty much want to go to school. 
 
While pretty much does have positive tendencies, they are not absolute, as sug-
gested above in (7d). We could speculate that the fusion of the NPI and PPI has 
something to do with its freer distribution or lessened sensitivity, but this is not 
material to the greater purpose of this paper.  
 
1.5. Speaker-oriented vs. What is Said3 
Potts (2005) distinguishes integrated VP adverbs that do contribute to the narrow 
sense of what is said from speaker-oriented adverbs that do not and instead 
function as utterance modifiers. In (17a-c) [Potts’s (4.121)] luckily is set off by 
comma intonation. 
 
(17) a. Luckily, Willie won the pool tournament. 
 b. Willie, luckily, won the pool tournament. 
 c. Willie won the pool tournament, luckily. 
 
According to Potts the commas represent intonational phrase boundary markers, 
suggesting the adverb contributes supplemental material and does not contribute 
to the narrow sense of what is said. For Potts, this is the primary factor in differ-
entiating uses of the adverb. Compare (17) to the pause-free (18a-b) [Potts’s 
(4.122)], which he claims do make semantic contributions in the narrow sense. 
 
(18) a. Willie luckily won the pool tournament. 
 b. Willie won the pool tournament luckily. 
 c. *Luckily Willie won the pool tournament. 
 
The diagnostic can be adapted easily to the degree compromising pretty much 
examples. The primary readings of (19a-c) involve a speaker comment on Eddie’s 
winning. 
 
(19) a. Pretty much, Eddie didn’t win anything. 
 a′. *Pretty much Eddie didn’t win anything. 
 b. Eddie, pretty much, didn’t win anything. 
 
                                                 
3 Here and throughout, I use Grice’s expression “what is said” (1989) to indicate asserted content 
and to contrast with what is implicated as well as with what Bach (1999) (following Grice) has 
called second-order speech acts: for example, adverbials such as confidently, in other words, etc., 
that can be “used to comment on some aspect of the speech act being performed in the utterance of 
the matrix sentence” (328). Relevance theorists would refer to these two levels of meaning as 
conceptual and procedural. 
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In the integrated (20), the primary readings are compromised, such that Eddie 
might have won a little bit, supporting the claim that non-pause pretty much is not 
just an utterance modifier and does contribute semantic content. 
 
(20) Eddie pretty much didn’t win anything. 
 
 Bach (1999:340) utilizes indirect quotation, his IQ test, to determine if an 
element contributes semantic content. If there can be an accurate and complete 
indirect quote of the utterance which includes the element in question, then the 
element does contribute semantic content. 
 
(21) a. David Lee pretty much doesn’t have a red cent (maybe a couple of 
bucks, but that’s it). 
 b. Alex said that David Lee pretty much doesn’t have a red cent 
(enough for the cab ride home, but that’s it).  
 
Now compare the speaker-oriented hedge’s (Use 1) behavior in the IQ environ-
ment. 
  
(22) a. Al, pretty much, smashed the ashtray. 
b. Sandy said that Al, pretty much, smashed the ashtray. 
 
(22a) expresses reluctance on the part of the speaker to make the statement—it 
does not compromise smash. In (22b) the hedge does express reluctance in the IQ, 
but it now belongs to the new speaker rather than to Sandy. It is difficult to assign 
a reading to (22b) where pretty much contributes to the original embedded state-
ment.  
 In the remainder of the paper I illustrate the problems compromising pretty 
much raises for K&L and Israel as well as how these problems are avoided by 
(non)veridicality. 
 
2. Kadmon and Landman’s Strengthening 
According to K&L, NPIs have a lexical property that induces semantic widening, 
which results in a reduced tolerance of exceptions. Pragmatic strengthening is a 
result of the NPI-contributed semantic widening. If this widening creates a 
stronger statement, the NPI will be licensed. K&L use NPI any as a test case, and 
their formalization is represented in (23). 
 
(23) (C) STRENGTHENING 
Any is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates a stronger 
statement, i.e., only if  
the statement on the wide interpretation    => 
the statement on the narrow interpretation 
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wide:  We don’t have potatoes, cooking or other. => 
 narrow: We don’t have cooking potatoes.  
 
 Now consider (24) [K&L’s (31)]: speaker A asks of speaker B (who is a cook 
for a group of 50 people). 
 
(24)  A1 Will there be French fries tonight? 
B1 No, I don’t have potatoes. 
A2 Maybe you have just a couple of potatoes that I could fry in my room? 
B2 Sorry, I don’t have ANY potatoes.4 
 
B2 is stronger than B1, as it excludes more kinds or quantities of potatoes than 
does B1. Let’s look closer at a non-stressed B2, represented below as (25a). (25a) 
does seem wider and stronger than (25b), as K&L suggest it should be. 
 
(25) a. Sorry, I don’t have any potatoes.   => 
 b. Sorry, I don’t have potatoes. 
 
But, the compromised and non-stressed (26a) clearly allows more exceptions than 
(26b), even with the widening any, contra what K&L would predict. Further, there 
is no entailment relation of the sort described in (23). 
 
(26) a. Sorry, I pretty much don’t have any potatoes. -/->  
b. Sorry, I don’t have potatoes. 
 
Further, it’s not clear to me that the compromised any example of (27a) is at all 
stronger than the compromised non-any (27b). 
 
(27) a. I pretty much don’t have any potatoes. 
b. I pretty much don’t have potatoes. 
 
Certainly the inference relation K&L require does not exist. More basically, 
K&L’s ability to state the strengthening relation is impeded. Recall: licensing 
occurs iff strengthening does. Strengthening is defined in terms of wide to narrow 
entailment (K&L 369). It appears that in an environment where the “strengthen-
ing” NPI is accompanied by a compromiser, the NPI has a less primary effect on 
the assertional force of the sentence, and problems arise for K&L’s proposal, as it 
is questionable if strengthening actually occurs even though the NPI is licensed 
perfectly.  
 
                                                 
4 The heavy stress on any is present in K&L’s example, though K&L claim widening is part of a 
semantic analysis of any and has nothing to do with stress. This does not seem correct to me nor to 
Krifka (1995). I’m not immediately concerned with stress in this paper, though.  
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2.1. Chierchia’s Extension of K&L 
Chierchia (2004) extends K&L’s system of NPI strengthening as licensing. 
However, he wants strengthening to occur within the c-command environment 
between licensor and licensee: i.e., between negation and the NPI. What goes on 
outside this environment is irrelevant. In other words, Chierchia has a scope 
requirement for strengthening. K&L clearly do not have this kind of scope 
requirement (see K&L §2.6), nor does Israel. 
 Accordingly, the examples used above against K&L are not problematic for 
Chierchia, as the compromisers in (26)-(27) are located outside the negation/NPI 
c-command environment. For Chierchia then, it is necessary to compromise 
within the scope site, as in (28). 
 
(28) Richie didn’t see pretty much anyone. 
 
(28) does not seem strengthened by the presence of the NPI—even with the 
stronger scope requirements. This would need to be explained by Chierchia.  
 
3. Israel’s Scalar Model of Polarity 
Israel (1996, 2001, 2005) classifies polarity items as either emphatic or attenuat-
ing. Emphatic polarity items include minimizers such as a red cent, move an inch, 
etc., and they must appear in sentences that are stronger or more informative than 
an assumed scalar norm. For example, (29a) contains the minimizer a drop, which 
is an emphatic NPI. For this NPI to be felicitous the sentence it appears in must be 
more informative than the assumed scalar norm, as in (29b). 
 
(29) a. Jimmie didn’t drink a drop. => 
b. Jimmie didn’t drink.   scalar norm 
 
(29a) is more informative than (29b), and thus the emphatic NPI should be 
licensed, as Israel predicts. 
 Attenuating NPIs are the mirror image of the emphatic, and so sentences with 
attenuating NPIs should be less informative than the scalar norm. Thus, (30b) 
contains the attenuating or weakening NPI much, and we see that the scalar norm 
in (30a) is in fact more informative, so much should be licensed. 
 
(30) a. Jerry didn’t drink.  => scalar norm 
  b. Jerry didn’t drink much. 
 
For the rest of the paper, however, I will only be concerned with the emphatic 
NPIs, as in (29). 
 Israel arranges the notions of informativity within a scalar model, which is 
based on work by Fillmore, et al. (1998) and Kay (1990). The scalar model is 
essentially a set of ordered statements, within which quantitative inferencing 
relations can be predicted. Dramatically simplifying, in a set of statements, {x3, 
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x2, x1}, if x3 is the stronger statement, then we can infer that if x3 is true then x2 
is also true. That is, x3 unilaterally entails x2. But, if x1 is true it does not follow 
that x2 is true. Importantly, this is a pragmatic entailment rather than a logical 
one. Nothing about the structure of the world guarantees it, but the structure of the 
scale suggests the inferences should be valid, ceteris paribus. 
 For Israel, then, the compromisers disrupt the inferencing relations that are 
necessary for him to predict where emphatic NPIs should appear. Consider (29) 
again, in which the inferencing relations hold and NPIs are licensed as Israel 
predicts. Compare (29) now with (31), in which the compromised emphatic in 
(31a) does not entail the scalar norm in (31b), but in which the NPI is still li-
censed. 
 
(31) a. Jimmie pretty much didn’t drink a drop.  -/-> 
 b. Jimmie didn’t drink. 
 
According to Israel, “if a proposition entails the norm, its assertion is informative 
[emphatic] because it exceeds what one would normally expect to be asserted” 
(1998:47). So, the failed entailment relation of (31a-b) causes a bit of tension for 
Israel, as he depends on the entailment relation to determine whether NPIs (or 
statements that contain NPIs) are informatively emphatic or understating, and thus 
in what environments they should be allowed to occur.  
 
4. Giannakidou’s (Non)veridicality 
For Giannakidou (1998, 1999, 2002, etc.), NPI licensing boils down to a couple of 
heuristics, which are given below in (32)-(34). 
 
  A definition of (non)veridicality 
(32) (i) Op is veridical just in case Op p → p is logically valid.  
Otherwise, Op is nonveridical. 
(ii) A nonveridical operator Op is antiveridical just in case  
Op p → ¬ p is logically valid. 
 
(33)  A linguistic expression α is a polarity item iff: 
(i) The distribution of α is limited by sensitivity to some semantic 
property β of the context of appearance; and 
(ii) β is (non)veridicality, or a sub-property thereof: β ∈ {veridicality, 
nonveridicality, antiveridicality, modality, intentionality, exten-
sionality, episodicity, downward entailingness,…} 
 
(34) Polarity licensing by nonveridicality  
A polarity item α will be grammatical in a sentence S iff α is in the scope 
of a nonveridical operator β in S. 
 
Essentially, a polarity item is acceptable if it falls within the scope of a nonveridi-
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cal operator such as negation and various others. So, what happens with the pretty 
much examples? Consider (35). 
 
(35) Bruce pretty much didn’t have any money. 
 
NPI any occurs in the immediate scope of a nonveridical operator, i.e., negation, 
and it is licensed regardless of the status of DE-ness or strengthening, etc. This is 
already superior to K&L and Israel. But what about (28) above that was used 
against Chierchia, which was compromised within the scope site? 
 
(28) Jon didn’t see pretty much anyone. 
  
We can paraphrase not-pretty much in (28) as hardly or barely. However, if Jon 
hardly saw anyone, then the fact remains that he did see someone. This is a 
veridical context then, and we would not expect polarity items to be licensed in it. 
So the (non)veridicality theory has a bit more explaining to do with examples like 
this one. 
 Giannakidou allows for a Linebarger-like negative implicature5 as a secondary 
licensing mechanism for weaker NPIs such as any, ever, at all, etc. She refers to 
these as the any-class of NPIs,6 and they are not licensed but are instead “rescued” 
or “tolerated.” According to Horn (2001) hardly and barely convey ‘not at all’ via 
negative implicature, so it seems no great leap to allow the same thing here, 
especially since we seem to be talking about a similar subset of weak NPIs 
appearing in the not-pretty much environment. That is, not-pretty much allows the 
weaker NPIs in (36a-c), but it is more allergic to the stronger NPIs of (36d-f), 
which the (non)veridicality theory does not allow to be rescued anyway. 
 . 
(36) a. I haven’t seen Disneyland that empty pretty much ever.7 
 b. So I didn’t have pretty much any money …8 
 c. We didn’t have pretty much any furniture in the living room …9 
d. *Kris didn’t have pretty much a red cent. 
 e. *Merle didn’t move pretty much an inch. 
 f. *Waylon didn’t buy pretty much squat. 
 
So, the not-pretty much examples seem to be accounted for by the existing 
                                                 
5 However, Giannakidou wants licensing by negative implicature as only a last-resort operation, 
not as a general pragmatic condition on NPIs like Linebarger (1987) does. 
6 Exactly how class membership is calculated here is not clear, as there do not seem to be free 
choice possibilities for ever and at all, as there is with any. 
7 <http://www.brendoman.com/index.php?cat=264> 
8 <http://oompaprincess.livejournal.com/> 
9 <http://www.mayamalia.com/longs/simplicity/chapter38.html> 
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machinery of the (non)veridicality approach.10  
 
5. Conclusion 
Statements that contain NPIs often do seem stronger or to carry a greater rhetori-
cal force than their non-NPI bearing counterparts, but it is questionable whether 
this plays any important role in actually licensing NPIs. That is, strong statements 
can be compromised and the NPIs remain completely interpretable. It seems then 
that notions of NPIs needing to strengthen statements (K&L) or NPIs needing to 
appear in stronger statements (Israel) are not exactly what is needed to answer the 
question of NPI distribution. On the other hand, the identification of a common 
semantic feature such as (non)veridicality seems to avoid problems raised by the 
compromisers. 
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